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European integration and 
supranational governance 
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz 
ABSTRACT We argue that European integration is provoked and sustained by the 
development of causal connections between three factors: transnational exchange, supra- 
national organization, and European Community (EC) rule-making. We explain the 
transition, in any given policy sector, from national to intergovernmental to supra- 
national governance, in two ways. First cross-border transactions and communications 
generate a social demand for EC rules and regulation, which supranational organizations 
work to supply. We thus expect that Community competences will be unevenly 
constructed, both across policy sectors and over time, as a function of the intensity of 
these demands. Second, once EC rules are in place, a process of institutionalization 
ensues, and this process provokes further integration. Although we recognize the 
importance of intergovernmental bargaining in EC politics, our theory is not compatible 
with existing intergovernmental theorizing. 
KEY WORDS Governance; institutionalization; integration; neo-functionalism; 
transnational society. 
In this article, we propose a theory of European integration, focusing on the process 
through which supranational governance - the competence of the EC 1 to make 
binding rules in any given policy sector - has been constructed. We necessarily 
confront some of the most puzzling questions posed by the evolution of the 
Community. Why has integration proceeded more rapidly in some policy domains 
than it has in others? To what extent is the Community governed by 'inter- 
governmental' or 'supranational' modes of decision-making? What accounts for 
the relative dominance of the neo-liberal project, and for the relative failure of social 
democratic visions of Europe to gain influence ? We do not claim to have definitively 
settled all controversy. But our theory yields responses to these questions, in the 
form of testable propositions, and intensive research has demonstrated the 
resilience of these propositions in a wide range of contexts. 
The article also reports the results of a collaborative research project, recently 
completed, on European integration and its impact on policy-making. 2 Brought 
together by a common concern for processes of history and institutionalization, 
and by a common dissatisfaction with 'intergovernmental' theories, the group set 

































298 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
out to develop a framework - a common vocabulary and heuristic - for 
understanding the dynamics of European integration. We then worked to trans- 
form this framework into a theory, by developing and testing causal arguments in a 
range of comparative case studies. Most important, we sought to explain the process 
through which supranational governance has emerged, widened, and deepened 
over time, in and across specific policy sectors. 
The theory privileges the role of transnational exchange (e.g. trade, the develop- 
ment of Euro-groups, networks and associations, and so on) in pushing the EC's 
organizations to construct new policy and new arenas for policy-relevant behavior; 
once constituted, these arenas sustain integration in predictable ways, not least by 
provoking expansion in the level and the scope of transnational exchange. Some 
members of the group focused on the emergence and institutionalization of these 
arenas (Cameron 1996; Fligstein and McNichol 1996; Sandholtz 1996; Smith 1996; 
Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1996); others studied the consequences of institution- 
alization for policy-making (Pierson 1996; Pollack 1996); and still others examined 
the reciprocal impact of supranational governance and national politics (Stone 
Sweet and Caporaso 1996), and national public opinion (Dalton and Eichenberg 
1996). 3 The product, a book manuscript now in preparation, will offer a positive 
alternative to the intergovernmentalist framework. 
The article proceeds as follows. In part I, we briefly contrast our theory with the 
main features of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. In parts II and III, 
we elaborate the theory more fully, defining key concepts, discussing causal 
relationships between variables, and deriving hypotheses about how European 
integration proceeds. We also report substantive findings, where appropriate, given 
space limitations. In the concluding section, we clarify our differences with 
intergovernmentalist theories of integration. 
I THEORETICAL C O N T E X T  
The primary theoretical divide in EC studies has been between intergovern- 
mentalism and neo-functionalism. Endless nuance and distinction exist within each 
approach, but in the end most theorizing on integration endorses either the 
following statement or its opposite: the distribution of preferences and the conduct 
of bargaining among the governments of the member states broadly explain the 
nature, pace, and scope of integration, and neither supranational organizations nor 
transnational actors generate political processes or outcomes of seminal 
importance. In recent decades, intergovernmentalists have worked to refine their 
framework, and some have aggressively proclaimed its superiority (e.g. Moravcsik 
1993, 1995). At the same time, neo-functionalism has gradually been abandoned. Its 
original adherents have moved away from integration studies, and critics of inter- 
governmentalism have not developed their own general theory, least of all by 
refining neo-functionalism (e.g. Marks et al. 1996; Pierson 1996; Sandholtz 1993, 
1996; Sbragia 1993). 
We set ourselves the task of developing and testing a theory of how supranational 
governance evolves over time. What we are seeking to explain, the nature and extent 

































European integration and supranational governance 299 
the competence to govern is held exclusively by the Community; in others, national 
institutions are the primary sites of policy-making; and, in many domains, the 
transfer of power from the national to the supranational level has been only partial. 
Within the same policy sector, the answer to the question, 'who governs?,' has 
changed over time. And in those areas in which EC institutions have become sites of 
policy innovation and change, one finds variation in the relative capacity of the 
member state governments, acting in summits and in the Council of Ministers, to 
control that policy. In specifying the research problem in this way, we commit 
ourselves to theorizing integration as a dynamic process that yields divergent 
outcomes. We therefore problematize the notion, strongly implied by neo- 
functionalist theories, that integration is the process by which the EC gradually but 
comprehensively replaces the nation state in all its functions. And we reject the 
comparative statics of intergovernmentalists as a mode of analysis incapable of 
capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration. 
Our theory, laid out in parts II and III below, privileges the expansion of 
transnational exchange, the capacities of supranational organizations to respond to 
the needs of those who exchange, and the role of supranational rules in shaping 
subsequent integration. We argue that supranational governance serves the interests 
of (1) those individuals, groups, and firms who transact across borders, and (2) those 
who are advantaged by European rules, and disadvantaged by national rules, in 
specific policy domains. The expansion of transnational exchange, and the 
associated push to substitute supranational for national rules, generates pressure on 
the EC's organizations to act. Generally, EC organizations, such as the Com- 
mission and the Court, respond to this pressure by working to extend the domain of 
supranational rules, in order to achieve collective (transnational) gains and to 
accomplish the purposes of the Treaties, broadly interpreted. A first hypothesis, 
then, is that the relative intensity of transnational activity, measured across time and 
policy sectors, broadly determines variation on the dependent variable (supra- 
national governance). 
We claim that transnational activity has been the catalyst of European 
integration; but transational exchange cannot, in and of itself, determine the specific 
details, or the precise timing, of Community rule-making. Instead it provokes, or 
activates, the Community's decision-making bodies, including the Council of 
Ministers. Member state governments often possess (but not always) the means to 
facilitate or to obstruct rule-making, and they use these powers frequently. 
Nevertheless, we argue, among other things, that as transnational exchange rises in 
any specific domain (or cluster of related domains), so do the costs, for 
governments, of maintaining disparate national rules. As these costs rise, so do 
incentives for governments to adjust their policy positions in ways that favor the 
expansion of supranational governance. Once fixed in a given domain, European 
rules - such as relevant treaty provisions, secondary legislation, and the European 
Court of Justice's (ECJ's) case law- generate a self-sustaining dynamic that leads to 
the gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncommonly, to 
spillovers into other sectors. Thus, we view intergovernmental bargaining and 
decision-making as embedded in processes that are provoked and sustained by the 

































300 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
organizations, and the growing density of supranational rules. And, we will argue, 
these processes gradually, but inevitably, reduce the capacity of the member states to 
control outcomes. 
Our theory has important affinities with neo-functionalism. We acknowledge 
the insights of two of the founders of integration theory, Karl Deutsch and Ernst 
Haas. On crucial questions, we believe, they got it right. What we find comple- 
mentary are Deutsch's emphasis on social exchange, communication and trans- 
actions, and Haas's attention to the relationship between global interdependence, 
political choice, and the development of supranational institutions. 
Deutsch and his collaborators held that increasing density of social exchange 
among individuals over prolonged periods of time would lead to the development 
of new communities (shared identity) and, ultimately, to the creation of a super- 
state with centralized institutions (e.g. Deutsch 1953; Deutsch et al. 1957). We agree 
that social exchange across borders drives integration processes, generating social 
demands for supranational rules, and for higher levels of organizational capacity to 
respond to further demands. If this demand is not supplied, the development of 
higher levels of exchange will be stunted. We set aside Deutsch's concern with the 
formation of communities and identities, per  se, and the issue of whether or not 
identity formation precedes state-building. Our dependent variable remains mode 
of governance, not the construction of a pan-European identity or of a super-state. 
Haas (e.g. 1958, 1961) conceived of integration as the product of growing 
international interdependence and pluralist, interest-driven politics. Mitrany had 
theorized what would happen in a world increasingly beset by policy problems that 
transcended national borders: governmental functions would steadily migrate from 
national governments, who would act on the basis of 'politics,' to global techno- 
crats, who would act on the basis of expertise. Haas recognized that the transfer of 
functions to supranational bodies would always be intensely contested, as some 
groups foresaw gains while others feared losses. He consequently saw the initial 
construction of supranational authority as the crucial political hurdle. Stripped 
down, Haas's neo-functionalist argument runs something like this. Some 61ite 
groups (leadership of political parties, industry associations, and labor federations) 
begin to recognize that problems of substantial interest cannot be solved at the 
national level. These groups push for the transfer of policy competence to a supra- 
national body, finding each other and establishing cross-national coalitions along 
the way. If the problem is important enough and pro-integration ~lites are able to 
mount sufficient political leverage, governments establish supranational institu- 
tions. 
Once supranational institutions are born, a new dynamic emerges. Haas 
pioneered in theorizing the logic of institutionalization at the supranational level 
(1961). He suggested a dynamic process. The creation of supranational authority 
leads to changes in social expectations and behavior, which feed back onto 
supranational policy-making, and so on. As supranational bodies begin to deliver 
the co-ordinative solutions that pro-integrationists hoped for, they become the 
locus of a new kind of politics. Groups increasingly seek influence over supra- 
national policies, opening up new political channels, but also helping supranational 

































European integration and supranational governance 301 
their authority. The dynamic is reinforced by the potential, inherent in integration 
processes, for functional 'spillover'. Spillover is achieved when supranational 
authority is extended to new, but related, functional domains, as it becomes evident 
that initial policy objectives cannot be adequately attained without such an 
extension. Neo-functionalists - especially Philippe Schmitter (1969, 1970) - also 
attended to the role of bargaining among member governments. But they at least 
implicitly argued (and we argue explicitly) that, as integration proceeds, member 
state governments become less and less proactive, and more and more reactive to 
changes in the supranational environment to which they belong. 
The three constituent elements of our theory are prefigured in neo-function- 
alism: the development of transnational society, the role of supranational 
organizations with meaningful autonomous capacity to pursue integrative agendas, 
and the focus on European rule-making to resolve international policy externalities. 
Further, we appreciate Haas's insight that supranational policy-making (govern- 
ance) generates a dynamic process of institutionalization. We do not, however, 
embrace all of Haas's neo-functionalism. Haas defined integration as 'the process 
whereby political actors . . .  are persuaded to shift their national loyalties, expec- 
tations, and political activities to a new and larger center' (Haas 1961: 367). Again, 
we leave as an open question the extent to which the loyalties and identities of actors 
will shift from the national to the European level. There is substantial room for 
supranational governance without an ultimate shift in identification. And we will 
specify somewhat differently the causal mechansims by which integration is 
provoked and sustained, tying both to the development of transnational society and 
to contemporary theories of institutions and institutionalization. 
Intergovernmentalists (especially Moravcsik 1991, 1993; but see also Garrett 
1992) conceptualize EC politics as a subset of international relations, namely, as an 
example of interstate co-operation sustained by an international regime. Successful 
regimes facilitate the ongoing co-ordination of policy among member states, by 
reducing the costs of information, policy innovation, and negotiation (e.g. Keohane 
1984). In Andrew Moravcsik's 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (1993, 1994), regime 
theory has been supplemented to take account of domestic politics. At times, 
Moravcsik conceives European politics as a two-level game (Evans et aL 1993). The 
crucial actors are national executives, who continuously mediate between domestic 
interests and the activities of the international regime. At other times, Moravcsik 
sequences, for analytical purposes, national preference formation (domestic 
politics) and intergovernmental bargaining (regime politics). National executives 
are constrained by, but also aggregate, domestic interests as national preferences; 
once fixed, the distribution of preferences among, and the 'relative bargaining 
power' of, member state governments determine outcomes. 
European integration is a product of these outcomes. As Moravcsik puts it: 'the 
EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each 
of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation' (1993: 473). In 
order to consolidate these bargains efficiently, member state governments establish 
and delegate powers to the EC's organizations, like the Commission and the ECJ. 
Although intergovernmentalists rarely focus empirical attention on the process of 

































302 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
previously determined by the member state governments, or are called to order if 
they pursue divergent agendas (Garrett 1992; Moravcsik 1995). 
National executives construct the EC's capacity to govern, Moravcsik argues, for 
two main reasons. First, for electoral reasons executives may find it in their interest 
to respond to international policy externalities by pooling their sovereignty at the 
supranational level. Such externalities are generated by international interdepen- 
dence. Second, in order to enhance their own autonomy vis ~ vis domestic actors, 
national executives may shift competence to govern to an arena (such as the Council 
of Ministers) that operates with fewer constraints on executive authority than 
national arenas. Why executives do so in some policy domains, but not in others, 
appears to be indeterminate. 
For Moravcsik, the following sequence encompasses virtually all that is impor- 
tant: rising interdependence > domestic politics and national preference formation 
> intergovernmental bargaining > delegation to supranational authorities > 
consolidation. Integration proceeds, but the sequence never varies in any 
meaningful way. In this imagery, transnational actors and society do not exist; 
instead, he notices domestic groups impacted by increasing interdependence. And 
supranational organizations do not impact integration processes in autonomous 
and decisive ways; instead, in accordance with their place in the sequence, they 
behave as rather faithful agents of intergovernmental bargains. By our reading, 
rising interdependence constitutes the only important causal factor that both 
provokes integration and is not decisively determined by intergovernmental 
bargaining. On this point, intergovernmentalism hardly displaces neo-function- 
alism, but rather relies on a causal argument developed by the neo-functionalists. 
We will return to our differences with intergovernmentalists in the concluding 
section. 
II A TRANSACTION-BASED THEORY OF INTEGRATION 
As most students of EC policy-making have observed, simple characterizations of 
the Community, as either 'intergovernmental' or 'supranational', will not do. The 
brute fact is that integration has proceeded unevenly, and theories of integration 
have failed to explain this unevenness. Most recent research on EC politics has 
focused either on the grand bargains (the Single European Act or the Maastricht 
Treaty, for instance), or on how day-to-day policy is made in specific sectors. 
Neither emphasis has provided an adequate basis for theorizing the dynamic nature 
of integration over time and across policy domains. When we began our joint efforts 
we perceived the need for a unifying heuristic capable of capturing this dynamic. 
From intergovernmental to supranational politics 
We thus propose a continuum that stretches between two ideal-typical modes of 
governance: the intergovernmental (the left-hand pole), and the supranational (the 
right-hand pole). 
One pole is constituted by intergovernmental politics. The central players in 
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1 2 3 4 5 
+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  + 
Intergovernmental Supranational 
politics politics 
Figure i Governance in the European Union 
Note: From left to right, the continuum measures the increasing influences of three 
factors on policy-making processes and outcomes within any given policy sector. 
These factors are: (1) supranational organizations; (2) supranational rules; and 
(3) transnational society. 
bargain with each other to produce common policies. Bargaining is shaped by the 
relative powers of the member states, but also by state preferences, which emerge 
from the pulling and hauling among domestic groups. These preferences are then 
given agency, as negotiating positions, by national executives in EC organizations 
such as the Council of Ministers. The EC level of governance operates as an inter- 
national regime in the functional, transaction-costs mode: it is a 'passive structure' 
that enhances the efficiency of interstate bargaining (Keohane 1984; Moravcsik 
1993). 
The other pole is constituted by supranational politics. A 'supranational' mode 
of governance is one in which centralized governmental structures (those 
organizations constituted at the supranational level) possess jurisdiction over 
specific policy domains within the territory comprised by the member states. In 
exercising that jurisdiction, supranational organizations are capable of constraining 
the behavior of all actors, including the member states, within those domains. Many 
would argue that 'federal politics' would be the appropriate label (Lenaerts 1990; 
Sbragia 1992, 1993). We use the term 'supranational,' in part, to emphasize that the 
EC is an international organization, and that EC politics is a form of international 
politics. And we have avoided using the term 'federal' here in order to avoid an 
argument about the precise nature of the EC polity and how it compares with other 
federal polities. Movement from left to right along the continuum indicates that a 
shift away from intergovernmentalism, and toward supranationalism, has taken 
place. 
In principle, the continuum is capable of situating - and therefore of character- 
izing- all international regime forms as sites (more or less) of intergovernmental or 
sites (more or less) of supranational politics. Unlike most regimes, which tend to 
organize interstate co-operation in one or a few closely related sectors, the EC 
possesses differing degrees of competence across a diverse range of policy areas. In 
principle, one could use the continuum to characterize the development of the EC 
as a whole, in terms of the composite picture of all policy areas. One could also use 
the continuum to chart the comparative development or lack of development of 
different policy sectors. Thus, policy sector A may be located at point 2, shading 
toward intergovernmental politics, while policy sector B may be located at point 4, 

































304 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
asserts that there are potentially many ECs. As discussed in the next section, we 
hope that by disaggregating EC governing processes by policy domain, we will be 
able to learn more about the nature of European integration than we can by 
working to characterize, in a blanket fashion, the EC as an 'intergovernmental' or 
'supranational' regime. 
Dimensions of institutionalization 
The continuum measures the movement from intergovernmental to supranational 
governance in three interrelated dimensions: 
• E C  rules: the legal, and less formal, constraints on behavior produced by 
interactions among political actors operating at the European level; 
• E C  organizations:  those governmental structures, operating at the European 
level, that produce, execute, and interpret EC rules; and 
• t ransnat ional  society: those non-governmental actors who engage in intra-EC 
exchanges - social, economic, political - and thereby influence, directly or 
indirectly, policy-making processes and outcomes at the European level. 
For any given policy area or process, movement from left to right along the 
continuum therefore measures the growing presence and intensity of each of these 
factors. 
We understand these dimensions to be crucial indicators of levels of integration 
in the EC. By 'integration,' we mean the process by which the horizontal and 
vertical linkages between social, economic, and political actors emerge and evolve. 
Vertical linkages are the stable relationships, or patterned interactions, between 
actors organized at the EC level and actors organized at or below the member state 
level. Horizontal linkages are the stable relationships, or patterned interaction, 
between actors organized in one member state with actors organized in another. We 
understand these linkages to be 'institutionalized' to the extent that they are 
constructed and sustained by EC rules. 
The three dimensions are analytically distinct, although we expect them to 
covary, as integration proceeds, in predictable ways. As we move from left to right 
along the continuum the influence of EC (or supranational) organizations on 
policy-making processes and outcomes increases. Supranational EC organizations 
include the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Parliament, and even at times the 
Council of Ministers. At the left-hand pole, the regime's organizations exhibit little 
if any meaningful autonomy from the most powerful member states. By autonomy, 
we mean an organization's capacity to define and pursue, on an ongoing basis, a 
politically relevant agenda. In intergovernmental politics, organizations facilitate 
intergovernmental bargaining and logistical co-ordination (they lower the 
transaction costs for governments). At point 3 on the continuum, supranational 
organizations may often be the source of successful policy innovation, a form of 
'relative' - but meaningful- autonomy. At the supranational pole, institutions may 
exercise substantial autonomy, as when they are able to innovate, in policy relevant 

































European integration and supranational governance 305 
The second dimension built into the continuum is legal-normative (see Stone 
1994). As we move from left to right along the continuum, EC rules achieve 
higher degrees of clarity and formalization. Consider those rules that govern the 
production, application, and interpretation of all other rules, such as secondary 
legislation, within the Community. At the far left of the continuum, rules are few 
and weak; they do not trump individual governmental interests that conflict with 
them. As we move along the continuum, rules stabilize state bargaining, 
delegitimize exit, and-  at the level of law- lay down binding standards of conduct 
enforceable by courts. Many of the rules governing EC policy-making are 
behavioral, that is, they have resulted from many years of constant interaction 
between state and supranational officials in a myriad of settings. But many of 
these rules are also highly formal, codified in treaty law, secondary legislation, and 
the ECJ's jurisprudence. Within any given policy domain, as we move right the 
rules governing the interactions of all actors, public and private, grow more dense 
and elaborate. 
The third dimension captured by the continuum is the presence and influence of 
transnational actors - interest groups, business, knowledge-based ~lites - on policy 
processes and outcomes. In intergovernmental politics, national executives mediate 
between domestic actors and supranational organizations and rules. In supra- 
national politics, transnational actors have a choice of fora in which to exert their 
influence. They may target national governmental structures - executive, legislative, 
or judicial - as well as supranational bodies, and they may play one level off against 
the other. 
Taken together, these dimensions are constitutive of supranational politics. If this 
is so, the group believes, these three factors must move together, and disjunctures 
that do occur in movement are short-lived. Organizations, rules, and social 
exchange are closely linked in the development of society and systems of govern- 
ance (March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; Stone Sweet, forthcoming) and are 
similarly connected in supranational politics. Organizations produce and transmit 
the rules that guide social interaction. They structure access to policy processes, 
defining political power and privileging some parts of society more than others. As 
supranational organizations acquire and wield autonomy, they are able to shape not 
only specific policy outcomes but also the rules that channel policy-making 
behaviors. As supranational organizations and rules emerge and solidify, they 
constitute transnational society by establishing bases for interaction and access 
points for influencing policy. As transnational society endures and expands, the 
organizations and rules that structure behaviors become more deeply rooted as 
'givens,' taken for granted as defining political life. Growth in one element of the 
supranational trio (organizations, rules, transnational society) creates conditions 
that favor growth in the other two. An expansion of the tasks or autonomy of 
supranational organizations creates opportunities for political action, which actors 
and groups will seek to exploit, thus expanding transnational society. As societal 
actors adjust their behaviors in response to new supranational rules, these rules can 
gradually be locked-in. If broader, global trends promote the growth of 
transnational society, there will be a corresponding demand for increased 

































306 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
Why movement occurs 
The continuum gives us tools with which to describe EC governance. We have also 
offered a proposition that would account for some of the dynamics of integration, 
namely, that movement in any one of the dimensions will tend to produce move- 
ment in the other two. In other words, there is an internal dynamic of institution- 
alization. But important questions remain to be theorized. Why does movement on 
any of the dimensions occur in the first place ? Why do some policy domains move 
farther and faster toward the supranational pole than others ? In this section we offer 
a theoretical account that can generate answers to such questions. 
Our starting point is society, in particular, non-state actors who engage in trans- 
actions and communications across national borders, within Europe. These are the 
people who need European standards, rules, and dispute resolution mechanisms - 
who need supranational governance. In the beginning, the causal mechanism is 
quite simple: increasing levels of cross-border transactions and communications by 
societal actors will increase the perceived need for European-level rules, 
coordination, and regulation. In fact, the absence of European rules will come to be 
seen as an obstacle to the generation of wealth and the achievement of other 
collective gains. Separate national legal regimes constitute the crucial source of 
transaction costs for those who wish to engage in exchanges across borders: 
customs and other border controls, differing technical standards, divergent health 
and environmental regulations, distinct systems of commercial law, diverse national 
currencies, and so on. Further, the costs of transacting across borders are higher 
than those involved in contracting within a single member state, to the extent that 
there exists no secure common legal framework at the supranational level, com- 
parable in its efficacy to that of national legal systems. As transnational exchange 
rises, so does the societal demand for supranational rules and organizational 
capacity to regulate. Transactors can exert pro-integration pressure on their own 
governments, but when these are reticent, transactors can access supranational 
arenas dominated by the Commission and the ECJ. 
Governmental actors clearly have their own interests, which may include 
maximizing their autonomy and control over resources. They may resist the shift 
toward supranational policy-making. But as they do so, they inhibit the generation 
of wealth within their territories by those actors who depend on European trans- 
actions. Such resistance is therefore sustainable only at a cost in prosperity (Mattli 
1996). Governments can also attempt to slow integration or push it in directions 
favorable to their perceived interests, but they do not drive the process or fully 
control it. In a fundamental sense, governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to 
the integration that is going on all around them. 
On this point, the contrast between our theory and intergovernmental 
approaches to the EC could hardly be greater, but we have not written national 
governments out of the story. In fact, intergovernmental decision-making is 
ubiquitous in the EC, present even at the far right-hand pole of our continuum (as it 
is in Canada and other federal systems). EC summits, intergovernmental con- 
ferences, and meetings of the Council of Ministers are practically defined by tough, 

































European integration and supranational governance 307 
approaches to integration. Adherents of these approaches begin by announcing that 
the 'grand bargains' are the defining moments of European integration, and then 
these historic agreements become the object of empirical research. But the grand 
bargains are, by definition, intergovernmental. The research results are quite 
predictable when one looks to intergovernmental bargains for evidence of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Thus the observation that bargaining among 
governments is ubiquitous in the EC does not settle theoretical controversy. Put 
differently, the term 'intergovernmental' is useful as a description of a specific mode 
of decision-making within the EC policy process. But to attend to what is inter- 
governmental about the construction of supranational governance does not require 
us to adopt, or to accept the validity of, 'intergovernmentalism-as-theory'. 
Indeed, we argue that intergovernmental bargaining in the EC more often than 
not is responsive to the interests of a nascent, always developing, transnational 
society. Indeed, the demand for EC rules and regulation provides the subject matter 
for the bargaining. With very few exceptions, EC legislation concerns, directly or 
indirectly, the creation of rules that facilitate or regulate intra-EC exchange and 
communications. The configuration of social interests that will be affected by 
European policy innovation may vary from state to state, which creates the dif- 
ferences over which governments must negotiate. But rather than being the 
generator of integration, intergovernmental bargaining is more often its product. 
The exclusive focus on grand intergovernmental bargains can also lead to serious 
distortions of the historical record. The 1970s have generally been regarded as 
disconfirmation of neo-functionalism; intergovernmentalists typically note that 
member state preferences diverged during those years and that few of the EC's 
ambitious plans at the beginning of the decade bore fruit (e.g. Taylor 1983). We do 
not read the story of European integration as one of stop-and-go, at least not in any 
general or comprehensive sense. At the height of De Gaulle's power in the 1960s, the 
ECJ moved aggressively to 'constitutionalize' the treaties (Stein 1981; Weiler 1981, 
1991). In the worst days of 'Eurosclerosis' in the 1970s, levels of intra-EC trade and 
other forms of exchange soared. And, as we would expect, both the amount of 
legislation and the number of organized EC pressure groups grew steadily through 
the 1970s (Fligstein and McNichol 1996: 22-3). Integration always proceeded, in 
some sectors and from some vantage points, despite the Luxembourg compromise 
and despite the divergence of state preferences. 
Empirical research supports the transaction-driven theory of European inte- 
gration. Stone Sweet and Caporaso (1996) focus on the political impact of the 
'constitutionalization' of the treaty system. They find that cross-national exchange, 
transnational judicial activity, and supranational rule-making rose steadily after the 
move to constitutionalization by the ECJ (1960s). In analyses of aggregate data, and 
in case studies of the sources and consequences of the judicial rule-making, they 
demonstrate the causal link we have proposed: transactors seek to reduce obstacles, 
which triggers a process leading to the production of EC rules (Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso 1996). 
The telecommunications case is equally clear. By the 1980s, Europe's fragmen- 
tation into national telecommunications monopolies was increasingly costly to a 
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spanning national borders. Telecommunications provide the infrastructure for the 
modern economy, and businesses from a multitude of sectors needed pan- 
European telecoms for their transnational activities (trade, strategic partnering, 
investment, finance, design, production, distribution, sales). These businesses, plus 
telecoms equipment makers and suppliers of new services and infrastructures, 
became ready allies of the Commission when it undertook to create a liberalized EC 
telecoms market. Governments resisted, but found that ECJ rulings and the 
Commission's use of Article 90 directives (that do not require Council approval) 
severely curtailed their ability to prevent liberalization and rule-making at the EC 
level. In fact, intergovernmental bargaining continued in the Council of Ministers, 
but always under the shadow of the Commission's capacity to bypass the Council 
with Article 90 (Sandholtz 19%). A remarkably similar story has been told about 
the liberalization of the European airline industry (O'Reilty, forthcoming). At a 
time of sustained increase in levels of passenger and freight transported by airlines, 
supranational organizations, in complicity with business and consumer groups, 
were gradually able to overcome the resistance of governments that had been hostile 
to deregulation. Once removed from national control, reregulation - at the 
European level - proceeded. 
Finally, Fligstein and McNichol report that, through the 1970s, both the 
quantity of EC legislation and the number of EC pressure groups expanded. Most 
significantly, pressure groups and legislation grew during the 1970s in domains 
where EC competences would later be enhanced by Treaty revisions. In other 
words, the interstate bargains that amended the Treaty in the 1980s were a response 
to the prior growth in transnational activity. 
The Treaty revisions of the 1980s took place in the context of a demand for more 
cooperation at the European level. One can infer that the crisis of the 1980s was 
partially precipitated by the limits of the institutions and organizations of the EC 
to deal with these activities. 
(Fligstein and McNicho11996: 31-2) 
The transaction-based theory implies a coherent answer to the question, why 
does integration proceed faster or farther in some policy areas than in others? We 
would look to variation in the levels of cross-border interactions and in the 
consequent need for supranational co-ordination and rules. In sectors where the 
intensity and value of cross-national transactions are relatively low, the demand for 
EC level co-ordination of rules and dispute resolution will be correspondingly low. 
Conversely, in domains where the number and value of cross-border transactions 
are rising, there will be increasing demand on the part of the transactors for EC level 
rules and dispute-resolution mechanisms. It makes sense, then, that the EC has 
moved farthest toward the supranational pole with respect to managing the internal 
market. Intra-EC trade and investment have grown steadily since the founding of 
the EEC, creating the need for greater degrees of supranational governance in issue 
areas closely linked to expanding the common market. Naturally, the EC rules for 
the single market have in turn encouraged increases in the cross-border transactions 
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impeded by the absence of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Or, put 
differently, though some argue for the political benefits that CFSP would bring, few 
societal transactors find its absence costly. There is therefore minimal social demand 
for integration in that policy domain. 
The theory also allows us to explain the general direction of integration in the 
common market. Business is likely to be the segment for which the material stake in 
cross-border transactions is greatest and most obvious. Companies with an interest 
in cross-national sales or investment will press for the reduction of national barriers, 
and for the establishment of regional rules and standards. By the same token, the 
consequences of integration for people in their roles as workers and consumers are 
less transparent. This would explain why European companies have had a greater 
impact on integration than have labor or consumers (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; 
Sandholtz 1992a; Green-Cowles 1993). We can thus account for the decisively neo- 
liberal (pro-market) character of recent events like the 1992 program and the 
Maastricht provisions on economic and monetary union. If integration is driven 
fundamentally by private transactors, and if capital is the group with the clearest 
immediate stake in intra-EC transactions (not to mention the resources required for 
political influence), it is not surprising that the major steps in integration should be 
congenial to those segments of business. 
We can now also respecify the spillover mechanism. As the most obvious 
hindrances to cross-national exchange are removed, or their effects reduced by 
the transaction-cost reducing behavior of supranational organizations and rules, 
new obstacles to such transactions are revealed and become salient. With the 
removal of tariffs and quotas, for example, differences in national regulatory 
standards - for the environment, health and safety, technical compatibility, and so 
o n -  become more apparent as obstacles to exchange. Economic actors seeking to 
benefit from intra-Community exchange will then target these obstacles, both by 
attacking regulatory barriers through litigation and by pressuring EC legislative 
institutions to widen the jurisdiction of the EC into new domains. Transactors 
will always prefer, other things being equal, to live under (or adapt to) one set of 
rules rather than six, or twelve, or fifteen. As governments and EC institutions 
respond, spillover occurs. 
Globalization, which is integration of a broader geographic scope, can also 
stimulate movement toward increased supranational governance within 
Europe. The integration of national markets (for goods, services and capital) 
and multilateral approaches to global problems (ozone, climate change, 
weapons proliferation) can create pressures for integration from above the 
nation state. Transnational actors are sometimes the conduit through which 
globalization stimulates advances in European integration. For instance, with 
the goal of increasing their competitiveness in world markets, European 
multinationals pressed for active EC high-technology programs (ESPRIT, 
RACE) as well as the creation of a genuine internal market (Sandholtz 1992b; 
Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). But globalization can also exert pressure 
directly on EC organizations. For example, the involvement of the EC in 
global environmental negotiations has strengthened expansion of Commis- 
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III INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Once movement toward the supranational pole begins, European rules generate a 
dynamic of their own, which we call institutionalization. In laying out the 
continuum, the objective was to establish analytic categories for conceptualizing 
and identifying movement toward supranational politics. In a subsequent section, 
we offered a theory as to why policy domains move toward the supranational pole. 
Our transaction-based theory of movement leads us, when we observe rising levels 
of transnational exchange, to expect more EC rules. We can thus explain why some 
policy domains move more quickly toward supranational governance than others. 
The theory does not tell us what specific rules and policies will emerge, or what 
organizational form supranational governance will acquire. 
In this final section, we propose a theoretical account of why shifts toward 
supranational governance tend to generate additional movement in the same 
direction, or at least make it difficult to reverse the shifts that have already occurred. 
In other words, the EC is not at any given moment simply the organizational 
instantiation of state interests, combined through negotiation into a lowest 
common denominator agreement. The supranational content of the EC does not 
fluctuate up and down to reflect the interstate bargain du jour. Rather, because of 
institutionalization, EC policy domains can become more supranational without 
some, or at times a majority of, governments wanting it or being able to reverse it. 
Like Haas, we argue that there is a logic of institutionalization. Rules and rule- 
making are at the heart of this logic. Rules define roles (who is an actor) and establish 
the social context in which actors' interests and strategies take shape. Rules define 
the game, establishing for players both the objectives and the range of appropriate 
tactics or moves. Actors behave in self-interested ways, but both the interests and 
the behaviors take form in a social setting defined by rules. Actors will try to exploit 
the rules for selfish advantage, or to change the rules to favor achievement of their 
objectives. But at any given moment, they take the rules as given. Institutions are 
systems of rules (Jepperson 1991: 149, 157; North 1990: 3, 6), and institution- 
alization is the process by which rules are created, applied, and interpreted by those 
who live under them. 
Institutions, contrary to the image of stability frequently associated with them, 
are in constant evolution. People acting within a rule context inevitably encounter 
the limits of the rules, that is, situations in which their content is unclear or disputed. 
Rules may not provide clear guidance for new kinds of transactions or behaviors. 
Or two actors may disagree as to what the rules require in a specific instance. In 
either case, actors will then make demands on the dispute resolution processes. 
They may push for the creation of new rules (legislation). Or they may seek reinter- 
pretation of the existing rules (adjudication). As they interpret and apply the rules, 
courts, legislators, and administrators necessarily modify them by establishing their 
effective meaning. The new or changed rules then guide subsequent interactions, as 
people adapt their behaviors to the rules. The disputes that arise thereafter take 
shape in an altered rule structure and initiate the processes that will again reinterpret 
and modify the rules. The new rules guide actor behaviors, and so on (Stone Sweet, 
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The logic of institutionalization is at work in the EC and is crucial to under- 
standing integration as a process. As European rules emerge and are clarified and as 
European organizations become arenas for politics, what is specifically supra- 
national shapes the context for subsequent interactions: how actors define their 
interests, what avenues are available to pursue them, how disputes are to be 
resolved. This creates the 'loop' of institutionalization. Developments in EC rules 
delineate the contours of future policy debates as well as the normative and organ- 
izational terms in which they will be decided. Since rules are central to 
institutionalization, the Treaty of Rome is the crucial starting point for subsequent 
integration. The Treaty established EC rules and rule-making procedures, and 
constituted EC organizations like the Commission and the ECJ. 
We would expect that, in general, integration would occur most readily in policy 
domains included in the Treaty. Policy domains mentioned in the Treaty have the 
advantage of a legal basis in the Union's fundamental rules. Treaty-based policy 
domains should move more quickly toward supranational governance, other things 
being equal, than policy areas for which a competence or legal basis would have to 
be constructed from scratch. Fligstein and McNichol show that 'most of the arenas 
in which the EC built competencies were laid down in the Treaty of Rome and the 
original language and definitions gave rise to organizational structures oriented 
towards producing legislation in those domains' (Fligstein and McNicho11996: 30). 
Integration, however, is not limited to those domains specifically called out in the 
Treaty. Where cross-border activities are of increasing importance, we expect to 
find the creation and growth of supranational governance. When there is no Treaty- 
based competence for such a development, the relevant actors will create one. 
(Conversely, policy domains mentioned in the Treaty but lacking cross-border 
transactions are not likely to move toward supranational governance.) Rising levels 
of cross-border transactions generate demand for EC rules and dispute resolution. 
Member governments can respond by amending the Treaty, or stretching Treaty 
clauses to cover new legislation. Article 236, for instance, permits the EC to 
establish supranational governance to achieve the general objectives of the 
Community. This provision has served as the legal basis for EC action in policy 
domains not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. Perhaps more important in 
practice, the ECJ has interpreted the Treaty so as to permit the expansion of supra- 
national policy domains (Weiler 1981). Again: the Court does not choose its 
questions; it responds to the cases brought, frequently, by transactors seeking 
clearer EC rules or enforcement of existing rules. The landmark Dassonville line of 
case law, which underpinned immensely consequential Commission initiatives and 
intergovernmental bargaining in the move to complete the common market, was 
sustained by private actors desiring the elimination of national practices that limited 
intra-EC trade (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). 
A clear example of a policy domain becoming supranational despite the absence of 
a treaty basis is the telecommunications sector. The Treaty of Rome makes no 
mention of telecoms. In fact, various Treaty provisions (Article 90(2) and Article 222) 
had traditionally been interpreted as exempting national telecoms monopolies from 
EC competition rules. A series of ECJ rulings undermined that supposed exemption. 
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telecoms monopolies with Article 90 directives. In short, the ECJ's reinterpretation of 
the Treaty enabled the Commission, supported by transnational coalitions, to effect a 
liberalization of telecoms that was faster, more far-reaching, and more co-ordinated at 
the EC level than almost any of the member governments wanted at any stage along 
the way (Sandholtz 1996). Or, as Michael Smith shows, interactions within the 
framework of European political co-operation, which were completely outside the 
Treaty structure, generated a body of informal rules and practices that significantly 
shaped government behaviors and interactions (Smith 1996). 
Thus, though the Treaty is the indispensable starting point, over time supra- 
national rules and rule-making processes evolve in ways that are not predictable 
from the ex ante perspective of those who establish them. The new rules create legal 
rights and open new arenas for politics; in this fashion they structure political 
processes thereafter. Actors - including governments, private entities, and EC 
bodies - adapt to the new rules and arenas. This dynamic is wholly absent in the 
intergovernmentalist account. Intergovernmentalists see governments as the 
sole mediators between non-state actors and EC policy-making. In contrast, our 
theory leads us to expect (and we do observe) private actors successfully employing 
the EC judicial process against member governments and pursuing political 
strategies directly at the Commission. Intergovernmentalists depict governments as 
directing the process of integration and establishing its limits. Our approach, in 
contrast, views governments as powerful actors who cannot always impose their 
preferred outcomes on other players in the EC political system (transnational 
actors, the Commission, and the ECJ), who also possess substantial legal and 
political powers. 
Finally, governments are ultimately constrained by rules whose production they 
do not control. National courts, guided by ECJ decisions, can compel their govern- 
ments to comply with EC rules they have opposed. For example, though the United 
Kingdom has taken the most anti-integration position in the Council with respect 
to social provisions, British courts responding to private litigants and ECJ rulings 
have forced the government to change domestic policies so that they align with EC 
laws that Britain opposed (Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1996). Similarly, though 
member governments bargained with each other with respect to telecoms 
liberalization, that bargaining took place during the crucial phase under the shadow 
of the Commission's newfound capacity, affirmed by the Court, to enact its 
preferred policies via Article 90 directives (Sandholtz 1996). 
The rule-centered logic of institutionalization also suggests why it is difficult, 
and sometimes impossible, for governments to reverse shifts toward supranational 
governance that have occurred. The Treaty - the constitution of the European 
polity - fixes the rule-making processes of the EC, and the ECJ is authoritative 
interpreter of this constitution. As substantive rules, such as secondary legislation, 
evolve, actors (including governments, as well as EC bodies and non-state entities) 
adjust their behaviors. The rules, since the impetus behind them is to facilitate 
cross-border transactions and communications, lead to new kinds and higher levels 
of transactions. The new transactions entrench interests. The result is a high degree 
of 'stickiness' in movement along the continuum. 
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with path dependence, the second with principal-agent relations. Paul Pierson 
makes two interrelated points: first, that significant gaps emerge between member 
state preferences and the functioning of EC policies and institutions; and second, 
that once such gaps develop, states cannot simply close them. The latter point is the 
crucial one with respect to the difficulty of reversing shifts toward supranational 
governance. Pierson argues that institutional change is a 'path-dependent' process; 
once institutional and policy changes are in place, social actors adapt to those 
changes, frequently making substantial investments in the process. A policy 
turnabout would entail the loss of these sunk costs, thus raising the costs for 
governments seeking to unwind supranational governance. Furthermore, decision 
rules often constitute major obstacles to reversing course. The process of adaptation 
to change in complex social settings also produces unintended consequences that 
are difficult to unwind. Thus institutional and policy outcomes become 'locked in,' 
channelling politics down specific paths and closing previously plausible 
alternatives (Pierson 1993, 1996). 
Mark Pollack assesses the conditions under which the EC Commission can act 
autonomously, recognizing that the Commission is the most constrained of the 
EC's supranational bodies (as compared to the Parliament and the ECJ). He 
employs principal-agent imagery to argue that the administrative and oversight 
mechanisms that principals (member governments) use to rein in agents (the 
Commission) can be costly and of limited effectiveness. Furthermore, agents can 
exploit divergent preferences among multiple principals, especially under more 
demanding decision rules, like unanimity (Pollack 1996). 
The path-dependence and principal-agent logics reinforce our argument that 
institutionalization in the EC is not reducible to the preferences of, or bargaining 
among, member governments. The expansion of transnational society pushes for 
supranational governance, which is exercised to facilitate and regulate that society. 
Once in place, supranational rules alter the context for subsequent transactions and 
policy-making. Actors - governments, supranational organizations, and non-state 
entities alike - adapt their preferences, strategies, and behaviors to the new rules. 
These adaptations, plus the importance of rules in shaping preferences and 
behaviors, are what make shifts toward supranational governance sticky and 
difficuk to undo. Finally, because specific policies and organizational forms emerge 
through a path-dependent process, in which numerous social systems interact in 
quite contingent ways, those outcomes can only be analyzed through historical, 
process-tracing case studies. Thus, whereas broad aggregate data reflect the causal 
link between cross-border transactions and EC rule-making (Stone Sweet and 
Caporaso 1996), case studies are essential for explaining the specific content and 
form of EC rules and policies (Pierson 1996; Pollack 1996; Sandholtz 1996; Smith 
1996; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1996). 
C O N C L U S I O N  
We have proposed a theory of integration that relies on three causal factors: 
exchange, organization, and rules. Transnational exchange provokes supranational 

































314 A. Stone Sweet and W. Sandholtz 
transnational society. To the extent that supranational organizations are successful 
at doing so, specific causal connections between our three factors will be 
constructed. These connections sustain an inherently expansionary process, not 
least, by means of policy feedback. As the structure of European rules becomes 
more dense and articulated, this structure itself will encourage private and public 
actors at all levels of the Community to forge new, or intensify existing, linkages 
(vertical and horizontal). Member state governments are important actors in this 
process. Nevertheless, we argue that the integration-relevant behavior of 
governments, whether acting individually or collectively, is best explained in terms 
of the embeddedness of governments in integration processes, that is, in terms of the 
development of transnational society and its system of governance. 
We do not want to be misunderstood on this last point. No one denies that 
certain elements, or stages, of the European policy-making process are inter- 
governmental. Governments are repositories of immense resources, both material 
(e.g. financial) and non-material (e.g. legitimacy). In the EC, national executives 
pursue what they take to be their own interests, which they express as constituting 
the national interest. And in the bargaining process, executives from the larger states 
command greater resources and tend,to wield greater influence on EC policy 
outcomes than those from the smaller states. But noticing governments and power 
does not entail accepting intergovernmentalism as a body of causal propositions 
about how integration has proceeded. Although we dismiss as untenable 
Moravcsik's proclamation that his version of intergovernmentalism is the 
'indispensable and fundamental point of departure for any general explanation of 
regional integration' (1995: 625) we have no trouble recognizing that 
intergovernmental bargaining is an ubiquitous feature of supranational governance 
(as it is in many federal polities). Indeed, in our research we constantly attend to the 
question of whether and how integration shapes the preferences of governments 
over time, and the extent to which it casts (and recasts) the nature and content of 
intergovernmental bargaining. In our opinion, Moravcsik has developed a theory of 
intergovernmental bargaining within a specific institutional context, that of the EC, 
but not a satisfying general theory of integration. 
Our theory accounts for causal relationships between variables that are system- 
atically downplayed or deemphasized by intergovernmentalism and, we argue, these 
relationships will regularly produce outcomes that significantly impact the trajectory 
of integration. Intergovernmentalism is rigid: integration proceeds, but nothing 
essential in European politics ever changes. In contrast, we expect that integration 
produces new political arenas; that the politics in these arenas will qualitatively differ 
from purely intergovernmental politics; and that this difference will have an impact 
downstream, on subsequent policy processes and outcomes. In Moravcsik's view, 
supranational organizations, like the Commission, are virtually always 'perfectly 
reactive agents', responding only to the 'delegation' of tasks pursuant to the 'pooling" 
of state sovereignty (1995: 616, 621). In contrast, we expect supranational bodies to 
work to enhance their own autonomy and influence within the European polity, so as 
to promote the interests of transnational society and the construction of supranational 
governance. In Moravcsik's view, 'Only where the actions of supranational leaders 
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can we speak of a serious challenge to an intergovernmentalist view' (1993: 514; 
emphasis in original). In response, we expect what intergovernmentalism is not 
capable of explaining, namely, that, as integration proceeds, the Court and the 
Commission will routinely produce rules (policy outcomes) that would not have 
been adopted by governments in the Council of Ministers, or in summitry. And we 
argue that the long-term interests of member state governments will be increasingly 
biased toward the long-term interests of transnational society, those who have the 
most to gain from supranational governance. 
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N O T E S  
1 We recognize the important formal distinctions between 'European Community' and 
'European Union.' However, since most of the activities we refer to in this article occur 
under the aegis of the European Community, we will consistently use 'EC' and 
'European Community.' 
2 In addition to the authors (co-convenors of the project), the working group included 
David Cameron, James Caporaso, Russell Dalton, Neil Fligstein, Paul Pierson, Mark 
Pollack, Alberta Sbragia, and Michael Smith. Although this article grew out of our group 
discussions, not all members subscribe to all the claims made in this article. 
3 Substantive areas included the free movement of goods, social policy, competition, 
monetary co-operation, telecommunications, foreign policy and security, and environ- 
mental protection. References are to papers presented at the conference, 'Supranational 
Governance: The Institutionalization of the European Union', Berkeley, California, 
November 1996. 
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